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FRANKSON MUSUKWA (Suing on his own behalf and as Executive Director of Zambia
Deaf Youth and Women) & OTHERS V. ROAD TRANSPORT AND SAFETY AGENCY
Natasha Kapuka 1
The Facts
The facts giving rise to the Musukwa case emanate from the revolving debate on whether deaf
people should be allowed to drive in the same way that able-bodied individuals have the liberty
to. The Petitioners (all deaf) approached the Court seeking a ruling to the effect that S.62 of
the Road Traffic Act, No. 11 of 2002 violate Articles 11(b), 22(1)(a) & 23(2) of the
Constitution of Zambia. The Petitioners contended that the Respondent’s refusal to grant the
2nd Petitioner a driver’s license, and its decision to revoke the 3rd Petitioner’s license was a
violation of their freedom of movement as well as the freedom from discrimination. The
Petitioners also alleged that this violation consequently prevented them from making a living
for themselves.
Additionally, the Petitioners contended that the position regarding drivers’ licenses in Zambia
is an anomaly. This is because deaf drivers can be issued with valid licences by the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) to drive anywhere in the region while a Zambian
national who is deaf cannot be issued a licence to drive within Zambia. This essentially entails
that a deaf Zambian citizen may be issued with a SADC license and can drive in any other area
in the region but Zambia.
Holding
The Court dismissed the petition, stating that the Petitioners’ freedom of expression was not
encroached in any way; that although the law is discriminatory, it was rightfully applied in the
interest of public safety. The Court advanced several reasons to substantiate their decision:
initially, that if deaf people are to be allowed to drive, they run the risk of causing accidents,
making them a danger to themselves and other road users; and additionally, that they would
not be able to communicate effectively with traffic officers and other road users.
Significance of the Judgment
The case in point elucidates two important issues; firstly, it brings into question what exactly
constitutes the freedom of movement. In this context it is, to a greater extent, an interpretational
issue. Article 22(1)(a) of the Zambian Constitution (the ‘Constitution’) guarantees the freedom
of movement. It states to the effect that no citizen shall be deprived of his freedom of
movement, and for the purpose of the Article freedom of movement means and includes the
right to move freely throughout Zambia. Although the provision does not explicitly list the
methods by which one may move within and outside Zambia, a literal approach to
understanding of the words in Article 22(1)(a) would reveal that individuals are free to employ
whatever mode(s) of transport they may have at their disposal.
The Courts in many local cases agree with this proposition. In Nawakwi v. The Attorney
General 2 the means of movement referred to was by air. The Court held that ‘a passport is part
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of the freedom of movement and as such it is a right for every Zambian to have one or be
indorsed in one unless there is a valid legal excuse barring such possession or endorsement.’
Also, in Nyirongo v. The Attorney General 3 it was held that pursuant to Article 22, on the
freedom of movement, a citizen has the right to travel and subsequently has the right to be
issued with a passport. Similarly, in the Musukwa case, the mode of movement employed was
the use of a car. To this end, it is safe to say that it fell within the ambit provided for by Article
22(1)(a) of the Constitution.
However, the Court averred that Article 22(1)(a) of the Constitution could not be brought into
question. It advanced that the provision speaks to the freedom of ‘movement within and
outside Zambia and had nothing to do with how people move around, in particular driving,
which was the basis for the petition.’ This seems to imply that the freedom of movement only
accounts for individuals moving from one place to another but does not consider how they
make those movements. However, if this is to make any logical sense, one would need to
employ the appropriate means required to get to wherever it is they desire to go, and these
means are many; walking, flying on an aeroplane, and driving, but to mention a few.
Most importantly, the case reveals the prevailing deficiencies in the law as regards the
protection of the rights of disabled people. The Southern African Litigation Centre Equality
Rights (SACL) commentators referred to it as ‘a lost opportunity for the practical application
of the CRPD, which represents a paradigm shift in applying a human rights-based approach for
persons with disabilities.’ 4 And agreeably so; it shows that Zambia still has a long way to go
in the realization of the rights of disabled people.
Zambia is a party to most of the International Conventions; one of these is the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) which was signed in 2008 and ratified in 2010.
The treaty is one of the main advocates for non-discrimination of disabled individuals.
Additionally, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights helps to drive this
agenda. It opined that where a country is unable to meet the minimum core standard it must
prove that is has tried its best to meet its minimum obligations. 5 Also, as per a reasonable test
developed by the South African Courts, a country must do what it can to provide for the needs
of the most desperate in society. 6
The Court in the Musukwa case neglected to view the case considering human rights. Such an
approach looks at ways in which disabled individuals’ rights may be incorporated in all aspects
of life. The decision was based more on physical prejudice. Besides, studies show that most
road traffic accidents are not caused because of one’s physical inability, but negligence and/or
recklessness. 7 Therefore, while many laws interfering with freedom of movement have strong
and obvious justifications, it may be desirable to review some laws to ensure that they do not
unjustifiably interfere with the right to freedom of movement. 8 The fact that the Judiciary has
tools at its disposal to give effect to socio-economic rights that are not being used shows that
they are unwilling to give protection to rights that are not contained in the Bill of Rights. It is
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therefore imperative that socio-economic rights are enshrined in the Bill of Rights so that they
too can adequately and legitimately be protected by the Courts. 9
Nevertheless, Judge Chawatama sympathised with the Petitioners, stating that the violation was
indeed, unfair. While these sentiments may provide some comfort to the affected parties, they
do very little in pushing the agenda of the inclusiveness of disabled people. This decision was
the Court’s chance to finally break through the walls of prejudice against disabled people. It
was an opportunity for it, as a pioneer to actualize some of the aspirations Zambia subscribes
to through international human rights instruments.
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